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The Demise of the Bivens Remedy is
Rendering Enforcement of Federal
Constitutional Rights Inequitable But
Congress Can Fix It
HENRY ROSE *
A federal statute allows a person whose federal constitutional rights
are violated by state actors to sue for damages. There is no analogous federal statute that allows a person whose constitutional rights are violated by
federal actors to sue for damages. In 1971, the United States Supreme
Court allowed a suit for damages against federal law enforcement officials
who allegedly violated Fourth Amendment rights to proceed directly under
the Constitution, creating the Bivens remedy.
Beginning in 1983, the Supreme Court reversed course and issued ten
consecutive decisions in which it denied a Bivens remedy because no federal statute authorizes suits against federal officials who violate federal
constitutional rights. The Supreme Court now considers recognition of a
Bivens remedy to be a “disfavored judicial activity.”
It is inequitable for a person whose federal constitutional rights are
violated by state actors to be able to sue for damages but not if federal actors violate the same rights. Congress should address this inequity by enacting legislation that authorizes a person whose federal constitutional
rights are violated by federal actors to sue for damages.
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A. INTRODUCTION
An inequitable gap exists in the enforcement of federal constitutional
rights in the United States. If a person’s federal constitutional rights have
been violated by state actors, a federal statute 1 allows the person to sue
them for damages to compensate for the harm suffered. There is no analogous federal statute that allows a person whose federal constitutional rights
have been violated by federal actors to sue them for damages. From 1971 to
1980, the United States Supreme Court allowed persons who alleged that
their federal constitutional rights had been violated by federal actors to seek
damages directly under the Constitution. However, in ten consecutive decisions since 1983, the Supreme Court has not allowed such suits to proceed,
principally because they have not been authorized by Congress. As a result
of this series of ten Supreme Court decisions, the right of aggrieved persons
to sue for damages to enforce their federal constitutional rights against federal actors who have violated them is severely limited. Congress should
enact legislation that allows persons whose federal constitutional rights
have been violated by federal actors to sue them for damages. If such legislation is enacted, enforcement of federal constitutional rights will be more
comprehensive and equitable.

1.

42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2022).
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B. THE SUPREME COURT’S CONSIDERATION OF DAMAGE SUITS AGAINST
FEDERAL ACTORS FOR VIOLATING FEDERAL CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS
In Bell v. Hood, 2 the plaintiffs sued agents of the Federal Bureau of
Investigation (FBI) to recover damages for violating the plaintiffs’ rights
under the Fourth and Fifth Amendments of the United States Constitution
in the way that the FBI agents searched the plaintiffs’ homes and arrested
them. 3 The lower federal courts dismissed the suit for lack of federal jurisdiction because it did not arise under the Constitution or laws of the United
States. 4 On appeal, the United States Supreme Court recognized that it had
not previously decided whether federal courts can award damages for violations of the Constitution by federal officers. 5 Nevertheless, the Supreme
Court held that the lower courts had jurisdiction to hear and decide the
plaintiffs’ claim because this key legal issue would turn on a construction of
the Constitution and the laws of the United States. 6 The issue of whether
federal actors could be sued for damages for violating federal constitutional
rights did not return to the Supreme Court for twenty-five years.
1.

THE RISE OF THE BIVENS REMEDY (1971-1980)

In Bivens v. Six Unknown Agents of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 7
Bivens sued the federal defendants seeking damages for violating his
Fourth Amendments rights in the way that they searched his home and arrested him. 8 The lower federal courts dismissed the suit for failing to state a
cause of action. 9 The Supreme Court rejected the defendants’ argument that
Bivens should only be allowed to pursue his state law tort claims against
them, because so limiting his claims would ignore the far greater harm that
federal agents who act unconstitutionally cause when they abuse their federal authority. 10 The Court recognized that historically, damages have been
the ordinary judicial remedy for an invasion of personal interests in liberty,
such as a violation of the Fourth Amendment. 11 The Court also found that
the case “involves no special factors counseling hesitation in the absence of

2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
(1971).
8.
9.
10.
11.

Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678 (1946).
Id. at 679-80.
Id. at 680.
Id. at 684.
Id. at 684-85.
Bivens v. Six Unknown Agents of the Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388
Id. at 389-90.
Id. at 390.
Id. at 390-95.
Id. at 395-96.
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affirmative action by Congress.” 12 The Court held that Bivens was entitled
to recover money damages for any injuries he suffered as a result of the
defendants’ violation of his Fourth Amendment rights. 13 As a result of this
decision, the Bivens remedy was created, allowing persons whose federal
constitutional rights are violated by federal actors to recover damages for
the harm suffered directly under the constitutional provision that is violated.
In Davis v. Passman, 14 the Supreme Court addressed whether Davis, a
former female employee of United States Congressman Passman, could
recover damages if she could prove that he terminated her employment
based on her sex in violation of the equal protection component of the Due
Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. 15 The Court found that for Davis,
like Bivens, a damage remedy was the only form of judicial relief available
to vindicate the alleged violation of her constitutional rights. 16 The Court
followed Bivens and held that Davis could recover damages if she prevailed
on the merits of her case by proving that Passman violated her equal protection rights. 17
In Carlson v. Green, 18 the estate of a man who died in federal prison
sued prison officials for damages alleging that he died because the prison
officials provided medical treatment to him that was so inadequate that it
violated the Eighth Amendment’s proscription against the infliction of cruel
and unusual punishment. 19 The Supreme Court held that even though the
estate had a claim against the federal government under the Federal Tort
Claims Act, 20 the estate also had a Bivens claim for damages for a violation
of the prisoner’s Eighth Amendment rights. 21
2.

THE FALL OF THE BIVENS REMEDY (1983-2020)

In Bush v. Lucas, 22 a federal employee of the National Aeronautics
and Space Administration (NASA) was demoted to a lower paid position
12. Bivens, 403 U.S. at 396-97.
13. Id. at 397.
14. Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228 (1979).
15. Id. at 230-31, 234-35.
16. Id. at 245.
17. Id. at 248. The Court also found that Davis’ suit against Congressman Passman
for his official conduct does raise special concerns involving hesitation in allowing a damage
remedy. Id. However, the Court concluded that those concerns are coextensive with Passman’s possible defense to Davis’ suit under the Speech and Debate Clause of the Constitution and the Court remanded the case for consideration of this issue. Davis, 442 U.S. at 246,
249.
18. Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14 (1980).
19. Id. at 16-17.
20. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346(b), 2671-80 (2021).
21. Carlson, 446 U.S. at 18-23.
22. Bush v. Lucas, 462 U.S. 367 (1983).
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because he made public statements critical of NASA that his supervisor
considered to be false. 23 The employee appealed his demotion within the
federal civil service system and was reinstated with backpay because his
demotion violated his First Amendment free speech rights. 24 While his civil
service administrative appeals were pending, the employee also sued his
supervisor for damages alleging that his First Amendment rights had been
violated. 25 The Fifth Circuit held that the employee had no claim for damages under the First Amendment because the relationship between the federal government and its civil service employees constituted a special factor
precluding such a claim. 26 The Supreme Court affirmed, finding that Congress is in a better position than the courts to evaluate the impact of litigation between federal employees about First Amendment rights on the efficiency of the federal civil service. 27 Unlike in Bivens, Davis, and Carlson,
the Supreme Court declined to allow the federal employee to seek damages
directly under the constitutional provision that had been violated because of
his available administrative remedies under the federal civil service system.
In Chappell v. Wallace, 28 enlistees in the United States Navy sued
their superior officers for damages, alleging unconstitutional racial discrimination in the manner that they were supervised by them. 29 The Supreme
Court held that the unique disciplinary structure of the military and Congress’ authority over the military system of justice dictate that no Bivens
remedy be allowed in this case. 30 In United States v. Stanley, 31 a member of
the U.S. Army was secretly administered doses of lysergic acid diethylamide (LSD) pursuant to an Army study of its effects on humans that caused
him to experience hallucinations, incoherence, memory loss, and act violently toward his wife and children. 32 Stanley sued unknown individual
federal officers alleging that they violated his constitutional rights. 33 The
Supreme Court held that no Bivens remedy was available for injuries that
“arise out of or are in the course of activity incident to [military] service.” 34
In Schweiker v. Chilicky, 35 persons who had been terminated from the
Social Security Disability Insurance (SSDI) program sued federal officials
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.

Id. at 369-70.
Id. at 370-71.
Id. at 371.
Id. at 371-72.
Bush, 462 U.S. at 389-90.
Chappell v. Wallace, 462 U.S. 296 (1983).
Id. at 297.
Id. at 304-05.
United States v. Stanley, 483 U.S. 669 (1987).
Id. at 671.
Id. at 672.
Id. at 683-84 (citing Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135, 146 (1950)).
Schweiker v. Chilicky, 487 U.S. 412 (1988).
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who administered the review of their disability status for damages, alleging
that the reviews did not comport with due process. 36 Social Security reported that in the early 1980s it had wrongfully terminated about 200,000 persons from SSDI and, in response, Congress had unanimously enacted legislation to reform the Continuing Disability Review (CDR) program. 37 The
Supreme Court concluded that since Congress had not authorized suits for
damages in its reform legislation, no claim for damages against the federal
officials who administered the CDR in an unconstitutional manner would
be allowed. 38
In FDIC v. Meyer, 39 Meyer successfully sued the Federal Savings and
Loan Insurance Corporation (FSLIC) for terminating his employment without due process, and a jury awarded him $130,000. 40 The Federal Deposit
Insurance Corporation (FDIC), the statutory successor of the FSLIC, whose
sovereign immunity had been waived by Congress, 41 appealed the damage
award and the Supreme Court reversed and held that a Bivens remedy is not
available against a federal agency, because Congress, not the courts, should
determine whether such a significant expansion of federal government liability is appropriate. 42
In Correctional Services Corp. v. Malesko, 43 a federal prisoner with a
diagnosed heart condition that limited his ability to climb stairs suffered a
heart attack when he was forced by prison officials to climb five flights of
stairs. 44 The prisoner sued the Correctional Services Corporation, which
operated the halfway house where the prisoner was injured under a contract
with the federal Bureau of Prisons.45 The Supreme Court followed Meyer
and held that the Bivens remedy is only available against individual federal
officers who violate constitutional rights and is not available against a private entity, like the Correctional Services Corporation.46
In Wilkie v. Robbins, 47 a landowner sued officials of the federal Bureau of Land Management for damages alleging that they violated his
Fourth and Fifth Amendment rights in their efforts to coerce him into granting the federal government an easement on his land. 48 Given the factually
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.

Id. at 418-19.
Id. at 415-18.
Id. at 414, 423, 426, 429.
FDIC v. Meyer, 510 U.S. 471 (1994).
Id. at 473-74.
Id. at 475, 480-83.
Id. at 471-72, 486.
Corr. Servs. Corp. v. Malesko, 534 U.S. 61 (2001).
Id. at 64.
Id. at 63-64.
Id. at 70-71, 74.
Wilkie v. Robbins, 551 U.S. 537 (2007).
Id. at 547-48.
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complex, longstanding nature of the dispute between the parties and the
knotty legal standards applicable to the case, the Supreme Court held that
Congress should authorize appropriate judicial remedies for this type of
dispute and a Bivens remedy should not be allowed. 49
In Minneci v. Pollard, 50 a prisoner at a federal facility operated by a
private company sued, seeking damages from several company employees
who the prisoner alleged deprived him of adequate medical care in violation
of his Eighth Amendment rights. 51 The Supreme Court held that in a suit by
a prisoner against privately employed persons working at a privately operated federal prison alleging Eighth Amendment violations, the prisoner
must seek a remedy under state tort law and no Bivens remedy would be
implied. 52
In Ziglar v. Abbasi, 53 aliens who were not lawfully in the United States
and were detained for months after the September 11, 2001, attack in a federal facility under harsh conditions sued three high executive officers in the
United States Department of Justice and two wardens at the facility, seeking
damages for violations of several federal constitutional rights.54 The Supreme Court initially pointed out that Bivens was decided before the Supreme Court developed its cautious approach to finding implied causes of
action to enforce federal statutes. 55 Although the Court recognized the validity of its precedents in Bivens, Davis, and Carlson, the Court’s notable
change in recognizing implied causes of action rendered expanding Bivens
to new contexts a “disfavored judicial activity.” 56 Moreover, the Court
found that separation-of-powers principles dictate that Congress has the
superior role in creating new substantive legal liabilities.57 The Supreme
Court also noted that its prior decisions regarding the Bivens remedy indicate that it will not be available where there are special factors counseling
hesitation in the absence of affirmative action by Congress.58 The Court
stated that if a lower court is asked to recognize a Bivens remedy, and the
case is different in a meaningful way from Bivens, Davis, and Carlson, the
lower court must assess whether there are special factors counseling hesita49. Id. at 561-62.
50. Minneci v. Pollard, 565 U.S. 118 (2012).
51. Id. at 120.
52. Id. at 125-26, 131.
53. Ziglar v. Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. 1843 (2017).
54. Id. at 1851-54.
55. Id. at 1855-58.
56. Id. at 1854-57 (citing Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 675 (2009)).
57. Id. at 1857 (citing Schweiker v. Chilicky, 487 U.S. 412, 426-27 (1988) and
Bush v. Lucas, 462 U.S. 367, 390 (1983)).
58. Ziglar v. Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. 1843, 1857 (2017) (citing Carlson v. Green, 446
U.S. 14, 18 (1980) and Bivens v. Six Unknown Agents of the Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403
U.S. 388, 396 (1971)).
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tion in the absence of affirmative action by Congress.59 The Supreme Court
found several factors, that counseled against the Court allowing a Bivens
remedy against the defendants, relating to the conditions of the plaintiffs’
detention—the national security implications of their work and these defendants’ need to avoid time-consuming litigation—and denied a Bivens
remedy against them. 60 As to one prison warden who allegedly allowed
prison guards to abuse the detainees in violation of the Fifth Amendment,
the request for a Bivens remedy arose in a different context than Carlson
and, therefore, the request for a Bivens remedy against this warden was
remanded to the lower courts to perform the special factors analysis. 61
In Hernandez v. Mesa, 62 a fifteen-year-old Mexican national was shot
and killed on Mexican soil by a United States border patrol agent who was
on United States soil. 63 The child’s parents sued the border agent for damages alleging that the border agent had violated the child’s Fourth and Fifth
Amendment rights. 64 The Supreme Court found that the assertion of a
Bivens remedy arose in a new context in this case, because it involves a
cross-border shooting that implicates the interests and functioning of other
branches of government. 65 The Court also found several special factors that
caution against recognizing a Bivens remedy: the effect on foreign relations
between Mexico and the United States; national security involving United
States border security; other federal statutes that create damage remedies
for persons injured by United States government officers but exempt such
injuries that occur abroad; and separation-of-powers concerns. 66 Due to
these factors, the Court held that Congress should decide whether a damages claim is available in this type of case and declined to recognize a Bivens
remedy. 67 Two justices concurred in the majority opinion but also urged
that Bivens be overruled: asserting that “[t]he analysis underlying Bivens
cannot be defended.” 68

59. Id. at 1859-60.
60. Id. at 1858-63.
61. Id. at 1858-59, 1863-65. On remand, the district court undertook the special
factors analysis and dismissed the Bivens remedy against the warden based on Ziglar. Turkmen v. Ashcroft, 2018 WL 4026734, at 14 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 13, 2018).
62. Hernandez v. Mesa, 140 S. Ct. 735 (2020).
63. Id. at 740.
64. Id.
65. Id. at 743-44.
66. Id. at 744-50.
67. Hernandez, 140 S. Ct. at 739, 749-50.
68. Id. at 750-53 (Thomas, J., concurring, joined by Gorsuch, J.).
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THE STATUS OF THE BIVENS REMEDY

A review of Supreme Court decisions since 1983 involving the Bivens
remedy indicates that the Supreme Court disfavors its expansion into new
contexts beyond Bivens, Davis, and Carlson. In ten consecutive cases since
1983, the Supreme Court has declined to recognize the availability of a
Bivens remedy. One circuit court judge has described the Fifth Circuit’s
interpretation of these Supreme Court precedents as rendering the Bivens
remedy only available in cases that factually match Bivens, Davis, or Carlson. 69 It is apparent that, under these Supreme Court precedents, few persons whose federal constitutional rights are violated by federal actors will
have judicial recourse to seek damages to compensate them for the harm
that they suffer due to these violations. These Supreme Court precedents
also indicate that a majority of the justices on the Supreme Court since
1983 believe that it is the responsibility of Congress, rather than the courts,
to determine whether persons whose federal constitutional rights are violated by federal actors should be allowed to seek damages in suits to enforce
their constitutional rights. As a result, Congress should address this gap that
has emerged in the enforcement of federal constitutional rights.
C. CONGRESSIONAL AUTHORIZATION OF DAMAGE SUITS FOR VIOLATIONS
OF FEDERAL CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS BY GOVERNMENT ACTORS
Since 1871, Congress has authorized damage actions against state actors who violate federal constitutional rights via 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and its
predecessor laws. 70 42 U.S.C. § 1983 has also been interpreted by the Supreme Court to apply to local government actors who, acting under color of
state law, violate federal constitutional rights. 71 However, Congress has not
enacted a statute analogous to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 that provides a damage
remedy for persons whose federal constitutional rights are violated by federal actors. 72
Amendments to the Federal Tort Claims Act imply that Congress has
recognized the Bivens remedy. 73 The Supreme Court in Hernandez accepted this view, but asserted that these provisions of the Federal Tort Claims
Act are “not a license to create a new Bivens remedy in a context we have
69. Byrd v. Lamb, 990 F.3d 879, 883 (5th Cir. 2021) (Willett, Circuit Judge, concurring).
70. Ziglar v. Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. 1843, 1854 (2017).
71. Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 168-69, 187 (1961).
72. Ziglar, 137 S. Ct. at 1854.
73. James E. Pfander & David Baltmanis, Rethinking Bivens: Legitimacy and Constitutional Adjudication, 98 GEO. L.J. 117, 121-22 (2009) (arguing that in amendments to the
Federal Tort Claims Act, Congress implicitly recognized the Bivens remedy and its role in
holding federal officers accountable for their violations of the federal Constitution).
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never before addressed.” 74 A consistent theme in the Supreme Court’s decisions in the Bivens cases since 1983 is that congressional action is necessary if there is to be broader enforcement of federal constitutional rights via
damage remedies against federal actors beyond the Bivens, Davis, and
Carlson precedents.
D. WHY CONGRESS SHOULD ENACT A SPECIFIC DAMAGES REMEDY WHEN
FEDERAL ACTORS VIOLATE FEDERAL CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS
1.

WHEN A LEGAL WRONG OCCURS A JUDICIAL REMEDY SHOULD BE
AVAILABLE TO ADDRESS IT

Since Marbury v. Madison, 75 the American legal system has been
committed to providing a judicial remedy to persons who experience a violation of their legal rights. 76 In Bivens, the Supreme Court relied on this
principle to hold that damages are available to vindicate a violation of a
federal constitutional right by federal actors. 77 No one disputes that federal
actors can, and do violate federal constitutional rights that cause compensable harm to the persons whose rights are violated. 78
In the context of litigation under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the basic purpose
of a damage award is to compensate persons for the harm caused by the
deprivation of their federal constitutional rights. The Court in Bivens recognized the primacy of damage awards to vindicate the violation of personal
federal constitutional rights. 79 Punitive damages are also available under 42
U.S.C. § 1983 when a state actor’s conduct is shown to be motivated by
evil motive or intent or when it involves reckless or callous indifference to
the federally protected rights of others. 80
In Schweiker v. Chilicky, the plaintiffs were seeking damages for emotional distress and for loss of food, shelter, and medical benefits caused by
the defendants’ termination of their disability benefits in violation of due
process. 81 The Supreme Court acknowledged that denying a Bivens remedy
74. Hernandez v. Mesa, 140 S. Ct. 735, 748 n.9 (2020).
75. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
76. Id. at 163.
77. Bivens v. Six Unknown Agents of the Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388,
397 (1971).
78. For example, in Cleavinger v. Saxner, 474 U.S. 193, 198 (1985), a jury found
that the petitioners (federal prison officials) had violated the respondents (two prison inmates) Fifth Amendment due process rights and awarded damages to the respondents to
compensate them for these constitutional violations. The Supreme Court remanded the case
to determine whether the petitioners were entitled to qualified immunity for their unconstitutional conduct. Id. at 206-08.
79. Bivens, 403 U.S. at 395-96.
80. Smith v. Wade, 461 U.S. 30, 56 (1983).
81. Schweiker v. Chilicky, 487 U.S. 412, 417, 419 (1988).
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to the plaintiffs would result in many hardships and injuries that would never be adequately compensated. 82 Nevertheless, the Supreme Court held that
since Congress had not authorized a damage remedy for the harm that the
plaintiffs suffered at the hands of the federal defendants, none would be
available to them. 83 For the plaintiffs in Schweiker, no damages were available to them even if they could have proven that they suffered substantial
harm as a result of the defendants’ unconstitutional conduct. In Schweiker,
like the other nine Bivens cases that the Supreme Court has decided since
1983, the Supreme Court severed the link between unconstitutional wrongs
and the judicial remedies needed to fully vindicate them.
2.

DAMAGE AWARDS DETER UNCONSTITUTIONAL CONDUCT

Damage awards entered against state actors who violate constitutional
rights are a formidable deterrent to their commission of future violations of
constitutional rights. 84 However, after the ten consecutive Supreme Court
decisions that denied a Bivens remedy, “redress for a federal officer’s unconstitutional acts is either extremely limited or wholly nonexistent allowing federal officials to operate in something resembling a Constitution-free
zone.” 85 This “wholesale immunity” that federal actors have for violating
constitutional rights may “induce impunity,” resulting in more unconstitutional conduct. 86 Federal actors should face the same liability for damages
as their state actor counterparts when they violate federal constitutional
rights. In this way, all government actors would be similarly deterred from
violating federal constitutional rights.
3.

SUITS SEEKING DAMAGES, LIKE SUITS SEEKING INJUNCTIVE RELIEF,
SHOULD BE AVAILABLE AGAINST FEDERAL ACTORS WHO VIOLATE
FEDERAL CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS

In suits seeking vindication of violations of federal constitutional
rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, plaintiffs can seek both damages and injunctive relief against state actors.87 It is long established that courts have the
equitable power to issue injunctions against federal actors who violate fed-

82.
83.
84.
85.
curring).
86.
87.

Id. at 417, 425, 428-29.
Id. at 414, 423, 426, 429.
Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 256-57 (1978).
Byrd v. Lamb, 990 F.3d 879, 884 (5th Cir. 2021) (Willett, Circuit Judge, conId.
SCOTT MICHELMAN, CIVIL RIGHTS ENFORCEMENT 31-32 (2020).
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eral law. 88 This precedent supports suits against federal actors that seek to
enjoin them from violating the federal Constitution. 89
The Bivens cases that the Supreme Court has decided since 1983 lead
to an anomalous result—persons whose federal constitutional rights have
been violated by federal actors will not likely have a claim for damages
against these federal actors, but they may seek to enjoin them from committing the same constitutional violations in the future. This anomaly is illogical. Persons whose federal constitutional rights are violated by federal actors should have the same rights to seek both damages and injunctive relief
as they would have under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against state actors who violate
their federal constitutional rights.
4.

THE DENIAL OF THE BIVENS REMEDY BY THE SUPREME COURT
RETARDS THE DEVELOPMENT OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

The protections afforded under the United States Constitution evolve
with judicial interpretations of the meaning of its provisions. When the Supreme Court declines to recognize a Bivens remedy as it has done consistently since 1983, it loses the opportunity to interpret the constitutional provisions at issue in cases against federal actors.
In Wilkie, the Supreme Court declined to recognize a Bivens remedy,
in part, because the plaintiff’s Fourth and Fifth Amendment claims raised
“a serious difficulty of devising a workable cause of action” involving the
need to develop judicial standards that “would be endlessly knotty to work
out.” 90 As a result, the Court concluded that Congress is in a better position
to fashion an appropriate remedy, if any, for grievants against federal governmental overreach like the plaintiff. 91 But, it is the role of the judiciary to
interpret the Constitution’s meaning. 92 The Court’s decision in Wilkie was a
transfer from the Supreme Court to Congress of a difficult constitutional
issue that the Court could have sought to resolve. The result was a lost opportunity for the Supreme Court to develop a deeper understanding of the
protections afforded by the Fourth and Fifth Amendments.
5.

THE BIVENS CASES CREATE AN INEQUITY IN THE ENFORCEMENT OF
FEDERAL CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS

Due to the Supreme Court’s decisions since 1983 involving the Bivens
remedy, an unacceptable inequity has developed in the enforcement of fed88. Armstrong v. Exceptional Child Ctr., Inc., 135 S. Ct. 1378, 1384 (2015).
89. MICHELMAN, supra note 87, at 99-100.
90. Wilkie v. Robbins, 551 U.S. 537, 561-62 (2007).
91. Id. at 562.
92. United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 703 (1974) (citing Marbury v. Madison, 5
U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803)).
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eral constitutional rights. If a person’s federal constitutional rights have
been violated by state actors, the person can sue these actors under 42
U.S.C. § 1983 for damages to compensate them for the injuries that they
have suffered. If a person’s federal constitutional rights have been violated
by federal actors, the person will only be able to sue the government actors
for damages if the Supreme Court’s precedents in Bivens, Davis, or Carlson
apply to the case. The Supreme Court has strictly limited Bivens remedies
to these three situations and, as a result, most persons whose constitutional
rights are violated by federal actors cannot recover damages to compensate
them for the injuries that they have suffered.
The United States Constitution is concerned with limitations on the
power of government. 93 The United States Supreme Court, in its decisions
since 1983 involving the Bivens remedy, has turned these limitations on
their head. In these decisions that have consistently denied a Bivens remedy, the Supreme Court has reduced governmental accountability by restricting the federal constitutional rights that can be enforced by damage awards
when they are violated by federal actors. In this line of cases, the Supreme
Court has protected the interests of the federal government over the interests of persons whose federal constitutional rights have been violated by
federal actors. As a result, enforcement of personal federal constitutional
rights has been diminished.
There is an answer to this inequity in the enforcement of federal constitutional rights that the Supreme Court’s decisions regarding the Bivens
remedy have created. The answer is for Congress to enact legislation that
allows persons whose federal constitutional rights are violated by federal
actors to sue the federal actors for damages to compensate the aggrieved
persons for the injuries that they have suffered.
E. LEGISLATIVE SOLUTIONS TO THE GAP IN THE ENFORCEMENT OF
FEDERAL CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS
Congress has at least three options to address the gap in the enforcement of federal constitutional rights that has resulted from the Supreme
Court’s Bivens decisions:
• Amend 42 U.S.C. § 1983 to allow claims against persons acting under color of federal law who violate federal constitutional rights;
• Enact a freestanding statue that is analogous to 42 U.S.C. § 1983
that allows damage awards against persons acting under color of federal
law who violate federal constitutional rights; or

93.

Crawford-El v. Britton, 93 F.3d 813, 831 (D.C. Cir. 1996).
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• Amend the Federal Tort Claims Act by repealing 28 U.S.C. §
2679(b)(2)(A) 94 and allowing claims against the United States for violations
of federal constitutional rights by persons acting under color of federal
law. 95
The key goal in each of these legislative approaches is to provide that
persons whose federal constitutional rights are violated by federal actors
will be able to sue for damages to compensate them for the harm that they
have suffered. In this way, Congress will address the current inequitable
gap that exists in the enforcement of federal constitutional rights.

94. This is a provision of the Federal Tort Claims Act that exempts civil actions
brought against employees of the federal government for violations of the Federal Constitution from inclusion in the exclusive remedy provision against the federal government in 28
U.S.C. § 2679(b)(1) (2021).
95. HOWARD M. WASSERMAN, UNDERSTANDING CIVIL RIGHTS LITIGATION 86 (2d
ed. 2018).

